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CHAPTER ONE 
THE IDEAS OF NORTHROP FRYE 
 
 
 
The sense of being something of a loner has always been . . . exceptionally 
true of me, with my introverted temperament, indolent habits and Canadian 
nationality. When I published a study of Blake in 1947, I knew nothing of 
any ‘myth criticism’ school, to which I was told afterwards I belonged: I 
simply knew that I had to learn something about mythology to understand 
Blake. When I published Anatomy of Criticism ten years later, I had never 
heard the word ‘structuralism’: I realized only that structure was a central 
concern of criticism, and that the new critics of that day were wrong in 
underrating it. I have had some influence, I know, but I neither want nor 
trust disciples . . . and if I have no disciples I have no school. I think I have 
found a trail, and all I can do is to keep sniffing along it until either scent 
or nose fails me. (SM, 99-100) 
 
The work of Herman Northrop Frye (July 14, 1912 – January 23, 1991) is 
best assessed with reference to his particular set of biographical 
circumstances, and not as part of any literary school or movement. Frye’s 
work has been the subject of misunderstanding, but this can be remedied 
by a contextual approach to his writings, which reveals his work as a 
detailed, specific, personal and lifelong project. The aim of this book is to 
situate Frye’s work within the social, political, philosophical and religious 
conditions at the time and place when his ideas were formulated. In the 
preface to his book, Northrop Frye, Ian Balfour says that Frye’s work 
“unfolds rather than evolves”; that is, his work was not really a linear 
development of changing interests, but an opening up of several key ideas 
(Balfour, x). This book attempts to see where these ideas come from. 
Therefore, it is helpful to begin with an overview of those ideas. 
Frye’s Critical Utopia 
 Frye believed that it must be the first duty of literary criticism to 
discover the meaning of literature, but within its context as literature. This 
is his mission in the Anatomy of Criticism (1957). In the Anatomy Frye 
refers to the “fallacy of determinism” (AC, 6), a phrase which reappears in 
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The Critical Path (1971), to describe the state of affairs which arises when 
other academic disciplines such as psychoanalysis, anthropology or 
sociology are allowed to encroach upon the ground of literary criticism. 
These critical approaches, because formulated for solving non-literary 
problems, cannot make authentically literary statements. Because these 
extraliterary disciplines had a systematic approach, Frye worried that 
literary critics, lacking any equally systematic guidelines within their own 
field, tended to borrow these systems from outside literature: “the absence 
of systematic criticism has created a power vacuum, and all the 
neighbouring disciplines have moved in” (AC, 12). Frye argued that 
criticism, in order to correct these false or inadequate interpretations, must 
therefore develop a body of knowledge that connects one literary experience 
to another.  
 Frye saw literature as a complication of relatively simple groups of 
formulae, which he termed ‘myths’ and ‘archetypes’. In the Anatomy, 
myth is a term referring to specific aspects of narrative structure, such as 
plot or story, but in Frye’s later work the term is also used to explore the 
cultural relevance of such stories or group of stories crucial for a given 
society. Myth is a structural principle in literary texts because literature is 
‘displaced’ mythology. Frye’s theory of displacement, set down in the 
Anatomy, but recurring throughout his work, accounts for “the adjusting of 
formulaic structures to a roughly credible context” (SS, 36). What would 
seem too strange or uncanny or simply too much at odds with 
contemporary manifestations of culture for an audience to comfortably 
tolerate is rendered acceptable or credible, in response to cultural 
demands. Thus, displacement allows Frye to deal with literature as 
historically conditioned, but not historically determined. This goes a 
considerable way in answering the charge of ahistoricism so frequently 
levelled against Frye’s critical method. The concept of displacement 
means that Frye’s schemata of “formulaic structures” are not so rigid that 
they deny the individuality of any one text, nor its place in history, but 
they nevertheless locate a text’s most appropriate and important context 
within a body of literary knowledge. 
When he used the term ‘archetype’, Frye referred to typical or 
recurring images that connect one text to all other literary texts. This 
granted a unity to all literary experiences. In “The Archetypes of 
Literature,” an essay which predated the Anatomy by six years and 
contained many of the key ideas expressed in this later book, Frye 
describes the archetype as any important symbol or image, such as the sea 
or the rose, which cannot remain within any single literary text, but 
extends its significance throughout the whole of literature. The term 
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archetype is used by Frye to refer to “a typical or recurring image . . . a 
symbol which connects one poem with another and thereby helps to unify 
and integrate our literary experience” (AC, 99). Frye believed that, as well 
as archetypal images, there are also archetypal genres, based upon the four 
main genres of tragedy, comedy, romance and irony. While any literary 
work is unique, it is also a part of a class of similar forms. Thus King Lear 
is unique, but it can be recognised as one of a number of works known 
collectively as tragedy. Any such genre study is based upon perceived 
analogies in form, the kinds of analogies that historical approaches cannot 
or will not make. For Frye, rhetoric also comes under the concept of 
‘archetype’, in that it consists of recurrence; examples of such recurrent, 
rhetorical archetypes include pattern, rhythm, rhyme, alliteration, 
assonance and meter. There are also structural or narrative archetypes 
essential to every literary artefact; these Frye referred to as mythos 
(narrative shape or story progression), dianoia, (meaning, theme or 
pattern), and ethos (characterisation, setting and relation of storyteller to 
reader). As well as the archetypes of literature, Frye says that there are 
literary conventions, by which he means groups of interconnecting 
archetypes; these create the ‘modes’ of high mimesis, low mimesis, 
romance, irony and myth; these are coloured by the tonal conventions of 
comedy or tragedy. Conventions also give rise to literary genres, such as 
ballad, lyric, dramatic, epic and prose forms, and to sub-genres, such as 
pastoral, elegy and ode.  
 It has frequently been said that Frye’s critical method relies on a range 
of spatial metaphors such as the dialectic, the cycle and the staircase. An 
example of the staircase can be seen in the first large essay in the 
Anatomy, “Historical Criticism: Theory of Modes,” where Frye identifies 
five modes of fiction: mythic, romantic, high mimetic, low mimetic and 
ironic. Frye’s modes are realised partly in terms of the proximity of the 
reader to the hero. At the top of the stairs, in the mythic mode, the heroes 
are gods; in romance, the hero is an exceptional person, above both 
ordinary humans and nature; in the high mimetic mode the hero is above 
ordinary humans but is subject to natural and social laws; in the low 
mimetic mode the hero is on the same level as ordinary humans, that is, 
not privileged in terms of status or qualities; in the ironic mode the hero 
appears to be in some way inferior to ordinary humans, yet the reader may 
recognise the hero as representative of humankind. An example of the 
dialectic emerges when Frye uses the term realism to refer to that which is 
antithetical to romanticism. Frye says that there is a tendency in romance 
“to displace myth in a human direction, and yet, in contrast to realism, to 
conventionalize content in an idealized direction” (AC, 137). Romance 
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contains mythical patterns set in a world close to human experience, 
whereas realism is an intensification of the low mimetic modes.  
 It is vital to realise that the “Theory of Modes” is not a simple 
taxonomy; it traces, first of all, the tendency of western culture to proceed 
from divine comedy to ironic tragedy, a movement paralleled by an 
increase in mimesis. Secondly, but perhaps most importantly, Frye claims 
that, in the twentieth century, literature is poised on the brink of a return to 
myth. Frye connects the mythic to the ironic using the term mythos in the 
sense of an ironic withdrawal from reality, the irony-myth connection 
being derived from the observation of actual examples of twentieth 
century literature. However, there is no reason to suppose that Frye was 
actually predicting that the cycle of modes would go round again. Rather, 
the notion of an immanent return to myth was primarily an eschatological, 
and not a teleological, utterance. Thus the “Historical Criticism: Theory of 
Modes” does not present a real history so much as an eschatological hope. 
What is more, the path of descent from and ascent back to myth describes 
the path of a circle, and not a linear, teleological progression. The 
significance of this will become apparent.  
 The second large essay in the Anatomy, “Ethical Criticism: Theory of 
Symbols,” uses the term symbol to refer specifically to “any unit of any 
literary structure that can be isolated for critical attention” (AC, 71). This 
essay is concerned with the systematising or classifying of symbols, but, 
more importantly, with the problems of literary meaning, symbolism and 
semiology. Frye is quick to point out that, like literature itself, criticism 
must be seen to be polysemous; Frye says, “the principle of manifold or 
‘polysemous’ meaning, as Dante calls it, is not a theory any more, still less 
an exploded superstition, but an established fact” (AC, 72). Manifold or 
polysemous criticism is not pluralist criticism, but “the possibility that 
there is a finite number of valid critical methods, and that they can all be 
contained in a single theory” (AC, 72). Again, it is apparent that Frye is 
arguing for the removal of invalid critical approaches, and the creation of a 
body of knowledge that discovers the meaning of literature, as literature. 
Frye subdivides his second essay into five sections, which he calls phases, 
in order to avoid any confusion concerning relative values which the term 
level frequently brings with it; this testifies to his desire to eliminate value 
judgements from criticism. By phases he means a sequence of contexts or 
relationships, each with its characteristic mythos, ethos and dianoia. Frye 
identifies five symbolic phases—the literal, the descriptive, the formal, the 
archetypal and the anagogic. The similarity between Frye’s phases and 
Dante’s polysemy is striking, and helps explain Frye’s position. In Dante’s 
Letter to Can Grande della Scala (c. 1319), to which Frye seems to refer 
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in the above quotation, Dante writes about polysemous meaning: “for 
there is one meaning that is derived from the letter, and another that is 
derived from the things indicated by the letter. The first is called literal, 
but the second allegorical or mystical” (Dante, 292). Dante goes on to use 
the Old Testament story of the Exodus from Egypt to illustrate his point; 
on the first level, the story is an account of an historical event; on the next, 
the story is an allegory of redemption of the people by Christ; the next is 
concerned with the conversion of the soul from sorrow to grace; finally, 
there is “the anagogical . . . [wherein] the departure of the sanctified soul 
from the slavery of this corruption to the liberty of everlasting glory is 
signified” (Dante, 292). 
In Frye’s five-phase semantic theory of symbols, and its accompanying 
hermeneutics, there is, as in the “Theory of Modes,” a sort of sliding scale 
or staircase, ranging from the most obvious literal meaning to the most 
profound, wherein art is withdrawn from obvious or explicit statement. It 
is here that Frye splits ordinary discourse, which is instrumental and 
communicative, from poetic discourse, which is autonomous and 
imaginative (though in his post-Anatomy writings, Frye argues that all 
discursive practices have a rhetorical and literary dimension). In the literal 
phase of Frye’s “Theory of Symbols”, the literary work has no context 
external to itself; words simply hang together on the page, and refer to 
each other, cat resembling sat and mat because the words rhyme. The 
next, descriptive phase makes use of learned relationships between sign 
and referent. In the Anatomy, Frye discusses the literal and descriptive 
phases simultaneously, in order to discuss the ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’ 
aspects of the literary work. Frye argues that literature is a unique form of 
verbalising, which deliberately turns its back on obvious, literal meaning 
or simple, descriptive language. Frye claims that literature is a form of 
verbalising which subordinates the relationship between the spatio-
temporal world and the conceptual, literary ‘world’ to integrity of pattern 
in the latter; the direction of meaning in the literal phase is inward, that is, 
towards the centre of this literary ‘world’, and, in the descriptive phase, 
outward, towards the spatio-temporal world. In the Anatomy, Frye argues 
that, if the reader concludes that a work’s descriptive meaning is 
subordinated or suppressed, then the work may be called literary. In the 
next phase, the formal, the symbol unites inward and outward meaning, 
outward meaning attracted to historical or philosophical ideas, and inward 
meaning occurring when these ideas are united with a literary form. In the 
archetypal phase, all poetic moons are attracted to all poetic moons, and all 
poetic roses to all poetic roses. It can be seen that Frye’s phases expand, 
moving from the discrete literary utterance to the connecting principles 
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present in the archetypal phase. The archetypal phase is not Frye’s 
ultimate phase, however, nor is it the ultimate limit of literary experience; 
that is to be found in the final phase, the anagogic. When the etymology of 
the word anagoge is examined, it can be seen that it is an ecclesiastical 
term formed from àνάγειν, meaning, ‘to lead up’, and refers to “religious 
or ecstatic elevation . . . mystical or spiritual interpretation” (The Compact 
Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “anagoge”). Thus the ultimate aspect of 
the literary experience ‘leads the reader upwards’. The theological and 
transcendent overtones of this definition, similarly found in Dante’s use of 
the same word, should be noted. Within the archetypal phase, there is a 
uniting of the unique text with the conventional, which takes place within 
the reader’s own synchronising process, achieved through the act of 
reading, which does not confuse itself with that act of reading, nor with the 
reader; what is more, this kind of literary experience connects this identity 
to the reader’s ‘identity’. Thus Frye’s ‘critical path’, a path which Frye 
claims winds between anxieties borne of extra-literary and pre-critical 
preoccupations, seems to be leading the reader towards some sort of 
mystical or anagogic revelation, whereby the reader is reborn. 
Anagogy is related to the transcendental urge that Frye terms human 
desire. This relation can be seen in his 1951 essay, “The Archetypes of 
Literature,” where Frye says, “the central myth of art must be the vision of 
the end of social effort, the innocent world of fulfilled desires, the free 
human society” (FI, 18). The term desire can best be clarified by 
describing what is undesired. In the chapter “Against Nature: On Northrop 
Frye and Critical Romance,” Daniel T. O’Hara shows how nature, that is, 
the non-human environment, is undesired, as it is not only alien, but 
absurd: 
 
It is a life of blind accident, cyclical violence, repeated bondage, and fatal 
destiny—a life, in short, without human shape. Consequently, in such a 
context, the formative power of art can only appear, Frye asserts in The 
Stubborn Structure, a collection of essays on literature and society, as a 
“counter-absurdity.” (O’Hara, 150) 
 
O’Hara quotes from Frye’s essay, “Dickens and the Comedy of 
Humours”: 
 
“Real life does not start or stop; it never ties up loose ends; it never 
manifests meaning or purpose except by blind accident; it is never comic 
or tragic; ironic or romantic, or anything else that has a shape. Whatever 
gives form or pattern [to life] is absurd, and contradicts our sense of 
reality.” (O’Hara, 150-1) 
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In fact, O’Hara misquotes Frye’s essay, because the sentence he quotes as 
“Whatever gives form or pattern [to life] is absurd, and contradicts our 
sense of reality” actually appears in the original as “Whatever gives form 
and pattern to fiction, whatever technical skill keeps us turning the pages 
to get to the end, is absurd, and contradicts our sense of reality” (StS, 240). 
Despite the misquotation, the basic sense of the original—that life has no 
plot or shape, but fiction does—is not lost. The idea that life is 
transformed by art and displaced in a cultural direction is vital, as this 
helps to demonstrate how literature is a function of desire, which is what 
Frye calls “the energy that leads human society to develop its own form” 
(AC, 106). Later in the Anatomy he says “the anagogic view of criticism 
thus leads to the conception of literature as existing in its own universe, no 
longer a commentary on life or reality, but containing life and reality in a 
system of verbal relationships” (AC, 122). This sense of literature 
containing, and not merely describing reality, is central to Frye’s ideas. 
 Frye uses the term Logos to refer to the all-consuming literary 
universe. To enter into this coherent system of literary experience “does 
not keep bringing the student back to similar points, but to the same point, 
to the sense of an identity in literary experience which is the objective 
counterpoint to his own identity” (CP, 29). Though the details of the 
structures of imagery may be unique to any one literary text, the structures 
have their analogues within the structures of other texts. “Everything that 
appears in the phenomenal world of literature” as a discrete literary text “is 
maintained in the Logos in a state of absolute identity, oneness, or total 
unity” (Barrett, 51). What is more, Frye claims that, if these analogues are 
followed, the end product is not similarity, but identity. Paradoxically, 
with regard to the identity of analogues within the structures of imagery 
existing between two or more texts, “it is identity which makes 
individuality possible” (CP, 32). Frye’s preference for metaphor helps to 
clarify what he means by this. “Outside literature, the main motive for 
writing is to describe [the objective world]. But literature itself uses 
language in a way which associates our minds with it” as opposed to 
merely describing it (EI, 31). According to Frye 
 
There are two main kinds of association, analogy and identity, two things 
that are like each other and two things that are each other. In descriptive 
writing you have to be careful of associative language. You’ll find that 
analogy, or likeness to something else, is very tricky to handle in 
description, because the differences are as important as the resemblances. 
As for metaphor, where you’re really saying ‘this is that’, you’re turning 
your back on logic and reason completely, because logically two things can 
never be the same thing and still remain two things. The poet, however, 
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uses these two crude, primitive, archaic forms of thought in the most 
uninhibited way, because his job is not to describe nature, but to show you 
a world completely absorbed and possessed by the human mind . . . The 
only genuine joy you can have is in those rare moments when you feel that 
although we may know in part, as Paul says, we are also a part of what we 
know. (EI, 32-3) 
 
Thus the subject is united with the objective world through metaphor. In 
the anagogic phase, everything is potentially identical to everything else— 
not similarity or uniformity; not a monotonous sameness, but a unity of 
variety. This is because “literature does not reflect life . . . it swallows it. 
And the imagination won’t stop until it’s swallowed everything” (EI, 80). 
This anagogic ingestion of the universe by the Logos allows Frye to locate 
a context for the study of literature, without having to surrender the 
autonomy of literature, though in works published subsequent to the 
Anatomy, he qualifies this extreme position: Frye adheres to this notion of 
a timeless and transcendent ‘centre’ which informs literature, though it is 
created by a metamorphosis and complication over time of archetypes and 
conventions. It should be apparent that the relation of criticism to literature 
can now be seen as anagogic, if it is pursued with reference to these 
archetypes; archetypal criticism takes the reader inside literature wherein 
criticism has an end in the structure of literature as a total form, and a 
beginning in each text studied. This notion of an integrated and unified 
literary experience is a crucial one. In the Anatomy, Frye says,  
 
In the greatest moments of Dante and Shakespeare . . . we have a feeling of 
converging significance, the feeling that here we are close to seeing what 
our whole literary experience has been about, the feeling that we have 
moved into the still centre of the order of words. (AC, 117-118) 
 
The anagogic ingestion of the universe into the order of words by the 
power of the Logos created the principle of the ‘centre’ of the literary 
universe, and also its containment of the whole of life and reality within a 
system of verbal relationships.  
 Because the Logos is both the centre and the circumference of the 
literary universe, the impetus informing every literary archetype and 
convention comes from the Logos. The Logos, when seen as a metaphor 
for imaginative potential, becomes a dynamic energy source. The Logos 
concept is further clarified in The Return of Eden, where Frye says that 
divine power “symbolized by music and poetry and called in the Bible the 
Word” releases energy “by creating form” (RE, 59). Frye’s decision to call 
this order of words the Logos possesses apparent theological overtones; it 
is the total Word, the circumference and the centre of the literary universe, 
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and “like St. Augustine’s God, has its center everywhere and its 
circumference nowhere” (SM, 26). 
 In the Anatomy, Frye says, “dianoia on the archetypal level is . . . the 
conflict of desire and actuality” (AC, 111). Put bluntly, there is a 
discrepancy between how and where humans live, and how and where we 
would like to live. One of Frye’s most crucial assertions is that there is a 
dialectic between what is desired and what is undesired. This takes the 
form of an axis mundi, or Christian ladder of perfection, which locates 
‘heaven’ in an upwards direction and ‘hell’ in a downwards direction. Frye 
explains how this dialectic is present in literature: 
 
Sometimes, as in the happy endings of comedies, or in the ideal world of 
romances, we seem to be looking at a pleasanter world than we ordinarily 
know. Sometimes, as in tragedy and satire, we seem to be looking at a 
world more devoted to suffering and absurdity than we ordinarily know. In 
literature we always seem to be looking either up or down. It’s the vertical 
perspective that’s important, not the horizontal one that looks out to life. 
Of course, in the greatest works of literature we get both the up and down 
views, often at the same time as different aspects of one event. (EI, 97) 
 
Hence the ‘horizontal’ is ‘centrifugal’, as it “looks out to life.” Literature 
works on this other, vertical plane of desire and the undesired. Desire 
provides the dynamics for the recovery of our lost identity, thus the other 
crucial rhythm or pattern present in Frye’s work is that of the cyclical 
quest. There are, then, two forces implied in the Anatomy, the one being 
the organising force arising due to the dialectic between the desired and 
the undesired, and the other being the organising force of recurrence. 
Rhythm is temporal recurrence, pattern is spatial recurrence. “Archetypal 
criticism, therefore, rests on two organizing rhythms or patterns, one 
cyclical, the other dialectic” (AC, 106). In “The Archetypes of Literature,” 
Frye brings together the idea of the dialectic between the desired and the 
undesired and that of the cycle or recurrence. He says, 
 
The human cycle of waking and dreaming corresponds closely to the 
natural cycle of light and darkness . . . This correspondence is largely an 
antithesis: it is in daylight that man is really in the power of darkness, a 
prey to frustration and weakness; it is in the darkness of nature that the 
‘libido’ or conquering heroic self awakes. (FI, 18) 
 
Thus the objective world is a darkness—the undesired, the natural and the 
fallen—and is antithetical to what humans desire. The quest of the 
conquering hero is in pursuit of the desired, the human and the unfallen. 
Literature does not only portray the desired; it also portrays the undesired. 
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This is especially true of twentieth century literature: 
 
We notice that modern writers . . . spend a good deal more of their time on 
the misery, frustration or absurdity of human existence. In other words, 
literature not only leads us towards the regaining of identity, but it also 
separates this state from its opposite, the world we don’t like and want to 
get away from. (EI, 102)  
 
 Literature is not the real, but the conceivable. Literature is displaced 
mythology, and myth prefers stylisation and abstraction. Myth allows 
people to turn into stags or willow trees, rather than adhering to realism, 
verisimilitude or other skilful and consistent imitations of human 
experience. Myth makes use of fictional and thematic design, and is 
unaffected by canons of plausibility adopted to imitate the familiar. The 
mythical world contains infinite potential—desire and reality are one; 
myth is, in other words, anagogic. The Logos, because it contains 
everything, is identical to experience, and, as we have seen, Frye prefers 
identity over similarity. Verisimilitude, on the other hand, is merely ‘like’ 
experience. Frye’s critical approach disapproved of most other twentieth 
century literary criticisms, because they tended to destroy the autonomy of 
the imaginative order of the literary world by tying it to the meagre, 
experiential world, and, while destroying that autonomy, also destroyed 
what was, for Frye, the real function of literature—to minister to creative 
human desire, to transform, rather than simply transcribe, the world so that 
it, and the reader, might be elevated. This is why Frye asserts that 
literature is made not of life, but of prior literature, its categories being 
mythic rather than existential, and why he sought to enclose the entire 
history of human culture as the history of human forms created by the 
human imagination. This is also why Frye has a personal preference for 
the comic mode over the tragic, and the romantic over the mimetic. Frye 
sees realism as linear and logical, whereas romance forms patterns 
between the poles of desire and the undesired. This idea influenced his 
system to the extent of making romance the core of all other forms. These 
forms are always archetypal in the sense that they facilitate an ‘eternal 
return’ of a golden age or unfallen world which does not exist in time or 
space, but as a vision of the ideal, the relationship of this to art being best 
expressed as art as Sidney’s “second nature” (Sidney, 8); it is significant 
that Frye chose to call his 1965 book on Milton The Return of Eden, and 
not The Return to Eden, Eden being a vision which can come to the reader, 
and not a place where the reader can actually go.  
 The ability to apprehend the Logos, that is, literature in its total form, 
enables the rebirth of the reader, and so constitutes, for Frye, a quest myth. 
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In The Educated Imagination, Frye says of the quest myth,  
 
This story of the loss and regaining of identity is, I think, the framework of 
all literature. Inside it comes the story of the hero with a thousand faces, as 
one critic calls him, whose adventures, death, disappearance and marriage 
or resurrection are the focal points of what later become romance and 
tragedy and satire and comedy in fiction, and the emotional moods that 
take their place in such forms as the lyric, which normally doesn’t tell a 
story. (EI, 102) 
 
The ‘critic’ mentioned in the above quotation is Joseph Campbell. In his 
book, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, first published in 1949, Campbell 
says, 
 
The standard path of the mythological adventure of the hero is a 
magnification of the formula represented in the rites of passage: 
separation—initiation—return: which might be named the nuclear unit of 
the monomyth. (Campbell, 30) 
 
The path of the hero comprises the standard mythological unit wherein the 
hero departs from the ordinary world, enters a world of supernatural 
wonder and peril, performs tasks and wins a decisive victory, returning 
with the power to help fellow humans. This, which Campbell termed the 
“monomyth,” is the fundamental structure underlying every mythical 
narrative. In The Secular Scripture, Frye describes his own cyclical 
architectonic, and the similarities to Campbell’s monomyth are apparent: 
 
There are . . . four primary narrative movements in literature. There are, 
first, the descent from a higher world; second, the descent to a lower 
world; third, the ascent from a lower world; and, fourth, the ascent to a 
higher world. All stories in literature are complications of, or metaphorical 
derivations from, these four narrative radicals. (SS, 97) 
 
While the themes of descent deal with “confusion of identity and . . . 
restriction of action,” themes of ascent deal with the reverse—“escape, 
remembrance or discovery of one’s real identity, growing freedom and the 
breaking of enchantment” (SS, 129). Campbell’s monomyth is similar to 
the way that Frye’s four mythoi of comedy, romance, satire/irony and 
tragedy, the four basic pre-generic plots for all literature, form a spiral 
shape. The cycle is represented by the mythoi in the way that they blur into 
one another as they ascend and descend: the descent from a higher world 
is the move from romance to satire/irony, the descent to a world lower still 
moves us into tragedy, comedy is the ascent from this lower world, and the 
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ascent to an even higher world lifts us back up to romance. The dialectic 
between nature and apocalypse is present in the way that the paired 
opposites of tragedy and comedy, romance and satire/ irony, contrast. 
Satire is “militant irony” (AC, 223), because it does not detach itself from 
the situation it describes, unlike irony, which detaches the reader “from the 
world we’d prefer not to be involved with” (EI, 56). Thus satire presents 
the reader with the possibility of change, and so, unlike irony, is potentially 
redemptive. Thus, the descent of Campbell’s hero is like the decline of 
romance into satire/irony; his further fall into the perils of the hero’s trials 
meets its nadir in tragedy, and the ‘upturn’ of events, the hero’s victory is 
Frye’s rise into comedy, and the ‘happy ending of the hero’s return, 
transformed by his quest, sweeps him back up to romance.  
 The path of Campbell’s hero is a spiral path, and not simply a cyclical 
one, because the hero is transformed, and so does not simply ‘return’ to 
the same point from which he started. In The Secular Scripture, Frye also 
claims that “the quest romance takes on a spiral form, an open circle where 
the end is the beginning transformed and renewed by the heroic quest” 
(SS, 174). According to Frye, cycles need not be fatalistic, need not 
suggest an inability to progress, and need not incorporate a theory of 
inevitability. The seasonal cycle repeats itself year after year, suggesting 
the eternal return, but the world has in fact grown a year older, hence the 
trajectory of history is that of a corkscrew or spiral, as opposed to a circle. 
Thus, romance is akin to summer, satire/irony to autumn, tragedy to winter 
and comedy to the rebirth and renewal of spring. However, what really 
effects the ‘cycle’, changing its fated trajectory into a spiral, is the 
motivating power of desire, enabling transformation through the infinite 
power of the human imagination. It is “the vertical perspective that’s 
important, not the horizontal one that looks out to life” (EI, 97). This 
vertical perspective of desire and imagination is important because it is 
this that redeems the individual. The real significance of the cycle lies in 
that it is “the only possible way of suggesting what is beyond the cycle” 
(SS, 174), that being transformation through desire and the infinite powers 
of the imagination. For Campbell, today’s hero-deed consists of “questing 
to bring to light again the lost Atlantis of the co-ordinated soul” (Campbell, 
338). The hero must be transfigured, detached from the rigours of the 
external and temporal world, and reconciled with the eternal world, the 
paradise that has been lost, in order that the hero might experience 
renewal, and bring this ultimate boon back to help his/her people. 
 A dialectic exists between apocalyptic revelation and its demonic 
inversion, desire moving us from the latter towards the former. The 
dialectic between the apocalyptic and the demonic is always present in any 
The Ideas of Northrop Frye 
 
13
genre, because irony always infers romance, and tragedy always infers 
comedy: comedy is the completed form of tragedy, sweeping the hero up 
out of hell, and romance takes us to the better world that satire and irony 
feel only as an absence. Therefore all examples of literature incorporate 
desire. Frye’s controlling archetype is the quest myth, in particular, the 
successful quest, or comedic romance. This leads Frye to favour comedy 
and romance over tragedy and satire/irony, myth over verisimilitude, and 
revelation over realism. Frye’s archetypal criticism and typological 
hermeneutics contain hierarchies based on this personal preference for 
comedy, romance, archetype and the oracular. These preferences are 
present in Frye’s work as an intimated return to the mythic mode, 
producing a model of history as spiral, and as dialectic between the desired 
and the undesired. What is more, there is a sense in which Frye’s 
theoretical method can itself be seen as a quest undertaken by each and 
every ‘hero-reader’. Romance is not only central to Frye’s architectonic of 
spatial metaphors; his critical method is itself a comic romance. 
 In The Secular Scripture (1976), Frye makes his opinion on the position 
of identity to literature clear. He says that de te fabula (the story is about 
you); in other words, the reader is the hero of the literary experience: 
 
One’s reading . . . becomes an essential part of a process of self-creation 
and self-identity that passes beyond all the attached identifications . . . 
Genuine humanism is not a return to [the literary canon], but an 
imaginative recreation of it . . . The mythological universe is not an 
ordered hierarchy but an interpenetrating world, where every unit of verbal 
experience is a monad reflecting all the others . . . it is how the world looks 
after the ego has collapsed. (SS, 186-7) 
 
The concept of the monad suggests that any literary work is a microcosm 
of the total order of words. To read—to enter into the literary universe—is 
to embark upon a quest to recover one’s true identity, just like the hero of 
a romantic quest. Within the ideal of the interpenetrating world of the 
imagination, every verbal experience is “a monad reflecting all the others.” 
Reading allows the imagination to achieve totality with reference to the 
centre of the literary universe, a centre which does not focus upon 
describing the spatio-temporal world, but upon transforming it, ingesting 
it, extending its centre to its own circumference. 
 Frye’s final ‘vision’ is one where art is not limited by social, moral or 
aesthetic values, which limit art by creating ‘canons’ of acceptable 
verisimilitude. Even the archetypal phase is not the ultimate phase, though 
in its drawing together of literary artefacts, and in its combination of 
recurrence and myth it comes close. The ultimate vision is to be found in 
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the ultimate phase—the anagogic. Frye equates the Logos with anagogy, 
saying that it is a storehouse of infinite potential and possibilities: “The 
anagogic view of criticism thus leads to the conception of literature as 
existing in its own universe, no longer a commentary on life and reality, 
but containing life and reality in a system of verbal relationships” (AC, 
123). Frye’s concept of ‘vision’ is best understood in the sense of the word 
as it is used in one of Blake’s Laocoön aphorisms: 
 
The Eternal Body of Man is the Imagination, that is, God himself . . . It 
manifests itself in his Works of Art (In Eternity All is Vision). 
 
Frye quotes this aphorism in his first book, Fearful Symmetry, published in 
1947 (FS, 30). This, along with the comparison of the Logos to St. 
Augustine’s God, gives reason to postulate that the Logos was simply 
another name for God. However, Jeannine Barrett insists that, despite its 
role as the ‘onlie begetter’ of literary texts, the Logos is not an actual 
divinity or ontological personality, so much as a metaphysical rationale for 
a systematic criticism (Barrett, 189). Barrett’s position is validated: three 
years after she submitted her thesis, Frye published The Great Code, 
where he identifies another phase beyond anagogy, which Frye called 
kerygma (GC, 30, 231).  He explores the concept in much greater detail in 
Words with Power (1990), where kerygma is explained as an extension of 
the metaphorical function, and as a term reserved for the special 
transforming power of the words of the Bible. Thus the Logos is best 
envisioned as the metaphysical destination for the reader-hero; it is not 
God, though it clearly points the reader in a ‘Godwards direction’.  
The notion of such an imagined and ideal goal associates readily with 
the concept of utopia. Thomas More created the name ‘Utopia’ as a pun on 
‘‘οủτόπος’ (not-place), and ‘εữτόπος’ (well-place), in order to convey the 
sense of a ‘good place’ which is, in fact, ‘no place’—an ideal that does not 
exist. In her book, The Concept of Utopia, Ruth Levitas argues that, 
though form, content and function vary with respect to different versions 
of utopia, the one element that remains constant is that of desire, which 
demonstrates, in a variety of ways ranging from the satirising of what 
exists to dreaming about a perfect world, a general tendency towards a 
better way of being and living. The preoccupation with the plausibility of 
utopia connects the term to myth; just as the term ‘myth’ has been used in 
a pejorative manner to suggest fallacious history, so, too, has the term 
‘utopia’ had its element of desire removed and its element of fantasy 
emphasised to make it a simile for unattainable or impractical politics. 
Levitas poses the question whether utopias are purely escapist and 
compensatory, or whether they are also anticipatory and involved in 
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reconstruction. Utopias differ from other political plans in that they are 
visions of an ideal state, and thus differ from the managerialism more 
commonly presented as pragmatic solution of immediate problems; it is 
often said that a utopia is a static state representing perfection rather than 
progress. However, Levitas asks whether utopias may not play a part in 
the historical process as a sort of ‘carrot on a stick’, an ideal which can act 
as a stimulus to progress in that it is an ideal towards which one may 
strive, even though it may be ultimately unattainable. Frye’s desire to 
attain a synoptic view of literature as a whole is as ambitious as his effort, 
in writing the Anatomy, to elucidate and contain all that criticism does, can 
do and should do. Perhaps, then, Frye’s aspirations are also so ambitious 
as to be unrealisable. Thus the Anatomy, when read as a piece of 
metacriticism, is essentially a quest in pursuit of an ideal, and can be 
regarded as a utopian criticism. The Anatomy is utopian in the sense that 
its ultimate goal—the Logos—is metaphysical and does not in any real 
sense exist; it also enables a utopian project—it acts as a ‘carrot on a stick’ 
in that it seeks to provide a method which, if followed, will grant access to 
the liberating and transforming powers of the imagination. Though there is 
a tension between these grand aspirations and the more pragmatic solution 
of discrete literary problems, the primary interest of the Anatomy is not to 
be found in its usefulness as a typology, but in its provision of a model of 
perfection to aspire towards. The ultimate desired object of Frye’s quest is 
eternally a deferred reference—a différence, as Derrida would say—and 
the Logos is Frye’s utopian, ‘transcendental signified’. 
 In his 1965 essay, “Varieties of Literary Utopias,” Frye compares the 
social contract with the utopia; the former, he says, citing J.S. Mill, passes 
a fiction off as fact, while the latter belongs primarily to fiction. The 
utopia is a speculative myth, yet it is not a theory with which to connect 
social facts, as literature is not concerned with imitating real life to such an 
extreme degree. Frye says that the utopia describes behaviour in ritual 
terms, which, because ritualistic, appears irrational, and so needs explaining; 
hence, the typical utopia’s narrator is a ‘tourist’ of the province, whose 
‘guide’ explains the significance of the behaviour they observe. Frye says 
that “a ritual is a significant social act, and the utopia-writer is concerned 
only with the typical actions which are significant of those social elements 
he is stressing” (StS, 110; italics added). In a sense, then, Frye, in 
searching for archetypes, is searching for literary ‘rituals’, repetitions that 
are performed in such a way as to provide a sense of continuity and 
coherence. The Anatomy can be thought of as a utopian ‘tour’ of the 
literary ‘world’, in that Frye is stressing literary ‘rituals’, that is, he is 
describing and explaining to his reader what he sees as typical or 
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significant. What is more, Frye says, “the typical utopia contains, if only 
by implication, a satire on the anarchy inherent in the writer’s own 
society” (StS, 111). Thus it is possible to see the Anatomy as a utopia, and 
perhaps even a satire on the ‘anarchic’ state of the ‘world’ of 
contemporary criticism. Satire, as we have seen, is “militant irony” (AC, 
223), so does not detach itself from the situation it describes, but presents 
the reader with a possibility that is potentially redemptive. 
 Towards the end of the Anatomy, Frye begins to mention Menippean 
satire, and Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), with 
increasing frequency. An important ‘clue’ to help establish the true nature 
of the Anatomy occurs where Frye mentions the two together:  
 
The word ‘anatomy’ in Burton’s title means a dissection or analysis, and 
expresses very accurately the intellectualised approach of his form. We 
may as well adopt it as a convenient name to replace the cumbersome and 
in modern times rather misleading ‘Menippean satire’. (AC, 311-2) 
 
In dealing with intellectual themes or attitudes, the Menippean satire will 
playfully pile up masses of erudition as dialogue, swamping its pedantic 
targets with their own terminology. Its targets are “pedants, bigots, cranks, 
parvenus, virtuosi, enthusiasts, rapacious and incompetent professional 
men of all kinds” (AC, 311-2). Frye’s Anatomy had similar targets in the 
field of literary criticism. Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy is a form of 
Menippean satire that replaces dialogue or colloquy with a symposium of 
essays, producing a dissection or analysis in intellectualised form. Hence 
the genre to which Frye’s book belongs is the anatomy; it should be noted 
that its title is, after all, Anatomy of Criticism, and not A System of 
Criticism. Once this has been noted, so many critics of Frye, who have 
seen the Anatomy as a straightforward statement of a scientific criticism, 
especially those adverse critics who have seen it as an over-schematised, 
anti-historical criticism which denies the individuality of any given text, or 
which uses texts to explain a theory rather than the usual reverse approach, 
now seem rather silly, as they have failed to notice what must be the most 
significant phrase in any text—its title. Frye says that “as the name of an 
attitude, satire is . . . a combination of fantasy and morality. But as the name of a 
form, the term satire . . . is more flexible, and can be entirely fantastic or entirely 
moral” (AC, 310). He goes on to describe Menippean satire: 
 
The Menippean adventure story may thus be pure fantasy, as it is in the 
literary fairy tale . . . The purely moral type is a serious vision of society as 
a single intellectual pattern, in other words a Utopia . . . The form itself is 
not invariably satiric in attitude, but shades off into more purely fanciful or 
moral discussions. (AC, 310; italics added) 
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This is a good description of Frye’s Anatomy. Its tone is moral, in that it 
describes what literary criticism should do. Its intent, to exclude value 
judgements from criticism, may appear to contradict this, until the real 
meaning behind Frye’s use of the often misleading term ‘scientific’ is 
seen: to be ‘scientific’ is not to search for any sort of limiting principle to 
apply to criticism; in his search for a ‘science’ of criticism, Frye is seeking 
an arena wherein praxis is not limited, but is brought about by the infinite 
possibilities of the imagination. It is rather like the meaning behind the 
title of another of Frye’s books, The Well-Tempered Critic (1963) In this 
title, Frye is referring to Bach’s collection of solo keyboard music called 
The Well-Tempered Clavier, written for the ‘well-tempered’ tuning 
system, which organised the keyboard into ‘circles of fifths’. This enabled 
unrestricted modulation from one key to another. The analogy between 
this and Frye’s method is clear: Frye organised literature into similar 
patterns, to enable similar ‘modulations’ to take place between literary 
works, regardless of genre or historical period. Thus to be ‘well-tempered’ 
does not in any way diminish the number of ‘melodies’ which can be 
created, but it does avoid ‘discord’. Similarly ‘scientific’ criticism does 
not diminish the mind’s free play, but strives to achieve quite the reverse, 
by denying the usefulness of determinist critical approaches and other 
equally limiting critical ‘fallacies’.  
 Frye justifies his search for a ‘scientific’ criticism by identifying the 
key problem: “criticism can talk, and all the arts are dumb” (AC, 4). 
Criticism is “a structure of thought and knowledge existing in its own 
right, with some measure of independence of” literature itself (AC, 4). The 
problem is summed up well by Louis Mackie: 
 
The uncertain relationship between criticism and literature frames the 
question about the ratio of truth to fiction in the science/art of criticism as 
Frye conceives it. To be a science and to deliver the truth about its subject 
matter, the structure of criticism must correspond to the structure of 
literature. But in order for criticism to enjoy the autonomy necessary to 
science, it must have its own structure, which is not that of literature: a 
fiction of its own. (Mackey, 448) 
 
Thus, what Frye is exploring is the nature of the relationship between the 
speechless power immanent in literary works and the discursive medium 
of criticism that seeks to liberate it. While criticism is about literature and 
is derived from it, the critic inhabits a world of criticism that he or she has 
built. Hence the critic is both apart from, and a part of, literature. This 
leads Mackey to conclude that the relationship between literature and 
criticism is essentially ironic. Mackie states how this ironic relationship is 
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emphasised by Frye’s use of ironic/oxymoronic chapter titles—it seems 
strange to have a “Polemical Introduction,” as the last thing one expects by 
way of introduction is someone looking for a fight, and it seems almost 
oxymoronic to have a “Tentative Conclusion.” Similarly, says Mackie, 
words like ‘science’ or ‘inductive’ function as rhetorical operators, 
pointing not to a critical method, but to a desire to correct a state of affairs, 
or a desire for truth. The object of this desire is utopian, and can never be 
attained, and so Frye’s use of such apparently scientific words is in fact a 
device of irony and satire—and an expression of a yearning for their 
dialectical opposite, romance. While it might at first appear, then, that the 
targets of Frye’s satire are critics he sees as operating incorrectly or 
irresponsibly, it is in fact criticism itself, and its desire for the utopia of an 
unattainable ‘ultimate truth’, that is being satirised; another look at the 
book’s title shows that the reader is reading an Anatomy of Criticism, and 
not an Anatomy of Literature. 
 As has been seen, the quest of the archetypal critic resembles 
Campbell’s hero-quest to recover the “co-ordinated soul.” Campbell 
recognises the importance of humour, not only as a “pedagogical lure,” as 
he says in the following quotation from The Hero with a Thousand Faces, 
but as a way of suggesting that desired ideal which transcends the real, 
spatio-temporal, world: 
 
Humour is the touchstone of the truly mythological as distinct from the 
more literal-minded and sentimental theological mood. The gods as icons 
are not ends in themselves. Their entertaining myths transport the mind and 
spirit, not up to, but past them, into the yonder void; from which 
perspective the more heavily freighted theological dogmas then appear to 
have been only pedagogical lures: their function, to cart the unadroit 
intellect away from its concrete clutter of facts and events to a 
comparatively rarefied zone, where, as a final boon all existence—whether 
heavenly, earthly or infernal—may at last be seen transmuted into the 
semblance of a lightly passing, recurrent, mere childhood dream of bliss 
and fright. (Campbell, 180-1) 
 
Because Frye mentions Burton and Menippean satire right at the end of 
the Anatomy, as though they were a sort of punchline, it is possible to see 
his book in a similar light, as a “less literal-minded and sentimental” 
comedic romance. In the television programme Joseph Campbell and the 
Power of Myth, Campbell held the following conversation with Bill 
Moyers, where he discussed the importance of the Trickster to religion: 
 
B.M. - I feel stronger in my own faith knowing that others had the same 
yearnings and were seeking for the same images to try to express an 
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experience that couldn’t be costumed in ordinary language. I feel much 
more kinship with those who follow other ways. 
J.C. - This is why clowns are good in religions, because they show that the 
image is not a fact, but it’s a reflex of some kind. 
B.M. - So does this help explain the Trickster gods that show up from time 
to time? 
J.C. - Very much that, yes. Some of the best Trickster stories are associated 
with our American Indian tales. Now these figures are clown-like figures, 
and yet they are the creator god at the same time, very often. And this 
makes the point, ‘I am not the ultimate image; I am transparent to 
something. Through me, through my funny form, I am mocking it, and 
turning it into a grotesque action.’ You really get the sense, which if I had 
been a big sober presence, you’d get stuck with the image. (author’s 
transcript of part of the programme broadcast on Sunday, September 2, 
1990, 9:25-10:05 pm) 
 
Frye can be seen as such a ‘Trickster’, using the mask of Menippean satire 
to draw attention to the utopian nature of his quest. This deepens our 
understanding of the playful erudition and self-satirizing which characterize 
the Anatomy. Frye attempts to reveal that which is so profound it is 
unknowable, but which can be approached through the anagogic 
experience of literature. The theological overtones of the terms Frye uses, 
such as anagogy and apocalypse, suggests that Frye’s archetypal criticism 
is motivated, by desire, towards some form of mystical revelation. What is 
revealed is the Logos, the “co-ordinated soul,” and a vision of the world in 
human form.  
Frye’s Critical Path 
 In the “Polemical Introduction” to the Anatomy, Frye argued for the 
need for a literary criticism that could provide a direct, discursive address 
to the reader, because literature is “a disinterested use of words; it does not 
address its reader directly” (AC, 4). According to Frye, “it is the critic’s 
task, in every age, to fight for the autonomy of the arts, and never under 
any circumstances allow himself to be seduced into judging the arts, 
positively or negatively, by their attachments” (StS, 87). Thus Frye 
advocated a detached critical perspective, and his archetypal method was 
intended to provide the disinterested approach to the solving of literary 
problems that he sought. Frye believed that the critic must avoid the 
“centrifugal fallacy of determinism” (CP, 32), where the force of the 
critic’s preoccupations external to literature causes a drift away from 
regarding the text in a literary manner. Such an approach results in a 
failure to create anything that could be called a literary criticism. For 
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example, a Freudian approach makes the text an allegory of the author’s 
repressions and unresolved conflicts, and a Marxist approach makes the 
text an allegory of the historical processes of class struggle. Frye terms 
these approaches through other academic fields “allegorical criticism” 
(CP, 18). Allegorical criticism does violence to the autonomy of literature 
by bringing an extra-literary framework into criticism, and provides only 
one kind of literary meaning. The meaning of any text should not be 
acquired through some determinist method, which depends upon the 
relating of literature to the extra-literary, because this can only limit, and 
not expand, an understanding of the text. By meaning, Frye refers not only 
to that which may be inferred from within the context of ordinary 
discourse, but to an additional and greater understanding arising within the 
imaginative context of literature itself. Allegorical approaches present the 
critic with the task of forming arbitrary comparisons between literary 
works and the extra-literary, a task which is ultimately futile, whereas an 
archetypal approach has its end in the total form of literature, and its 
beginning in each text studied. Another danger is the “centripetal fallacy, 
where we fail to separate criticism from the pre-critical direct experience 
of literature” (CP, 33). The fallacy is centripetal because it diverts energy 
away from criticism through the force of the reader’s preoccupations with 
plot, with anticipation of outcome, with whether or not the plot and 
closure are credible, and so on. It is the habit of the plot-preoccupied 
reader of digesting whatever is given as a progression of events that 
preoccupies the reader with what the text apparently says, while 
overlooking what it is, which Frye is discouraging.  
 Frye points out that “criticism, like religion, is one of the sub-academic 
areas in which a large number of people are still free to indulge their 
anxieties instead of studying their subject” (CP, 33). ‘Anxiety’ is the name 
Frye gives to extra-literary preoccupations of a committed, often political 
and always socially and historically determined kind. Critics are not 
criticising literature if they “indulge their anxieties,” but are still 
functioning at a pre-critical level that emphasises literal meaning. The 
critical reader, however, enters into a coherent system of experiences 
structured around conventions, or archetypes. Though all humans possess 
“anxiety of continuity” and “anxiety of coherence” (CP, 37), which stem 
from fears of the discontinuity and incoherence of external reality, when 
these anxieties are translated not into art but into praxis, they cease to 
legitimately reflect normal human fears. The proper place for anxiety is in 
literature, because “the fundamental job of the imagination in ordinary life 
. . . is to produce, out of the society we have to live in, a vision of the 
society we want to live in” (EI, 140). 
